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Unconscionability, Freedom, and The
Portrait of a Lady
Jennifer Nadler*
The doctrine of unconscionability allows a court to refuse to enforce a
contract because of its unfairness. Although well settled in contract law,
the doctrine remains controversial. Critics of the doctrine argue that it is
impermissibly paternalistic: it rescues responsible agents from the
consequences of their own mistakes.' Defenders of the doctrine admit its
paternalism but insist that the unfairness in cases of unconscionability
makes paternalist intervention legitimate.2 Critics say that the doctrine is
sentimental3 and wonder if the resort to expressions such as "shocks the
conscience" conceals the defenders' inability to articulate the standard
these agreements supposedly transgress.' Defenders say that the doctrine
is intentionally open-ended, allowing for a judge's sympathetic attention
to the complaining party's circumstances.5
The controversy over unconscionability's legitimacy and proper
interpretation reflects a deeper disagreement about the meaning of
freedom.6 More specifically, it reflects a disagreement about whether
* Jennifer Nadler has a B.A. with high distinction in English and Political Science from the University
of Toronto, a J.D. with honours from the University of Toronto, an LL.M. from New York University,
where she was a Vanderbilt Scholar, and an S.J.D from the University of Toronto. She teaches
Contract Law and Property Law at Osgoode Hall Law School.
1. See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION
92-93 (1981); Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115
U. PA. L. REV. 485, 556-57 (1967); David Shapiro, Courts, Legislatures, and Paternalism, 74 VA. L.
REV. 519, 536 (1988).
2. See e.g., Robin West, The Anti-Empathic Turn in PASSIONS AND EMOTIONS: NOMOS LIHI 243
(James E. Fleming ed., 2012); Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and
Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L.
REV. 563 (1982); Anthony Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763 (1983);
Robin West, Taking Preferences Seriously, 64 TUL. L. REV. 59 (1990).
3. FRIED, supra note 1, at 105.
4. Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 269, 285 (1986).
5. See West, The Anti-Empathic Turn, supra note 2, at 269. In A&M Produce Co., Justice Wiener
wrote that "[u]nconscionability is a flexible doctrine designed to allow courts to directly consider
numerous factors which may adulterate the contractual process." A&M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp.,
186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 120 (Ct. App. 1982).
6. Philip Bridwell also notices that the controversy about the unconscionability doctrine reflects
the philosophical controversy between proponents of a negative understanding of liberty and
proponents of a positive understanding of liberty. See Philip Bridwell, Philosophical Dimensions of
the Doctrine of Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1513, 1514 (2003). However, Bridwell argues
that there is no account of positive freedom that will lead to a principled and coherent application of
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freedom is best understood as the abstract capacity for choice or as the
realization of that capacity in a life that reflects a thought-out scheme of
commitments and values.7 When critics say that unconscionability
unravels freely formed agreements, they mean that the agreements were
not extracted by duress or fraud. When defenders say that where the
doctrine applies, the choice to enter the agreement was not really free,
they mean that the choice, though voluntary, fails to reflect the
individual's deliberatively formed and valued ends. This disagreement
means that in order to evaluate the arguments made by the doctrine's
critics and defenders, we must evaluate the conceptions of freedom that
underlie them. Moreover, if we can show that the conceptions of freedom
behind these arguments are actually constituent parts of a complete
conception of human freedom, then perhaps we can arrive at an
understanding of unconscionability that resolves the current controversy.
But how can we evaluate competing conceptions of freedom so as to
arrive at a fuller understanding? One possibility is moral or political
philosophy. Impersonal argument, beginning from that which cannot be
doubted and ending with logically derived truths, is one way to proceed if
we wish to resolve a moral question. But it might be that there are certain
truths that cannot be established by way of standard philosophical
argument because we cannot reason our way into their authority beginning
from a point of critical doubt and detachment. It might be, moreover, that
the truth about the kind of beings we are and the kind of respect and
concern owed us is a truth of this kind. If that is the case, then we must
take a different approach to thinking about these questions. We must begin
with an act of assent rather than of skepticism, with an exploration of
human lives that already assumes that they matter rather than with a
philosophical probing for that which cannot be doubted. Observing how a
certain conception of freedom works itself out in a concrete human life,
we ask ourselves what truth that conception seems to capture and what it
seems to miss. If the lived implications of a particular conception of
freedom undermine its own starting point, that will give us good reason to
regard that conception as false or incomplete. We will then have to try out
an alternative conception that captures what the other missed, observe its
consequences in a life lived in accordance with it, and again ask ourselves
whether these consequences adequately reflect the ideal it is supposed to
embody.
What I have just described is an act of the moral imagination as distinct
the unconscionability doctrine; in this article, I argue for just such an account.
7. This explains why the debate so often seems to be a disagreement over the meaning of the word
"voluntarily." For example, see Thomas Scanlon's criticism of Nozick in Nozick on Rights, Liberty,
and Property, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 14 (1976). It also seems to explain why, as Seana Shiffrin notes,
arguments about whether an agreement was "truly voluntary" often reach an impasse. See Seana
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from one of moral ratiocination. It is the sort of act involved in reading a
work of literature as an exploration of the meaning of freedom. An
exploration of this kind is what Henry James gives us in The Portrait of a
Lady. At the novel's center is the problem of Isabel Archer's
independence and of what it means to live a life of one's own. The novel's
movement reflects the development of Isabel's idea of freedom from
freedom as the abstract capacity for choice to freedom as the effort to
discover an identity and set of commitments from within the community
and relationships that are a part of one's life. Isabel's story is the story of
the partiality of each of these conceptions as an understanding of what it
means to lead a life of one's own.9
Read as an exploration of the meaning of freedom, The Portrait of a
Lady illuminates what is at stake in the controversy around the doctrine of
unconscionability and suggests a way of resolving that debate. James's
novel reveals that the conception of freedom as freedom of choice is
inadequate, not from some other perspective (say, from the perspective of
care or equality), but from the perspective of freedom itself. It thus
suggests the need for a richer understanding of human freedom and so for
private law doctrines, like unconscionability, that embody such an
understanding. However, as we see what goes wrong in Isabel's effort to
lead a life of her own, Portrait warns us of the problems with simply
replacing a thin conception of freedom with a richer one. This deepens our
understanding of unconscionability's normative foundation and resolves
the disagreements regarding its interpretation. In particular, it helps us
understand why unconscionability must be an exception to, not a
substitute for, the usual rule that a voluntary agreement between two
responsible parties is binding, why it must not apply to bargains just
because they are onerous or unevenly divide the gains of trade, and why it
must not apply to one who, with full knowledge and understanding,
chooses to enter a contract that is contrary to an objective conception of
what her well-being requires. Moreover, this understanding of the
unconscionability doctrine suggests a new way of thinking about the two
8. HENRY JAMES, THE PORTRAIT OF A LADY (Houghton Mifflin Riverside ed. 1963) (1881).
9. Although many critics have treated Portrait as essentially a psychological study, others agree
that this is not its primary focus. For example, Arnold Kettle notes that in Portrait's Preface, James
writes that the novel is about "the conception of a certain young woman affronting her destiny,"
indicating that the interest "is not primarily a psychological one, not a matter of mere personal
analysis." ARNOLD KETTLE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ENGLISH NOVEL: HENRY JAMES TO THE
PRESENT 19 (1951). Richard Poirier writes, "[t]his is a novel of ideas more than of psychology, an
imitation of moral action more than a drama of motive." Richard Poirier, Drama in The Portrait ofa
Lady, in TWENTIETH CENTURY INTERPRETATIONS OF THE PORTRAIT OF A LADY 35 (Peter Buitenhuis
ed., 1968); see also ROBERT PIPPIN, Portrait, in HENRY JAMES AND MODERN MORAL LIFE 126-43
(2001) (for an exploration of Portrait's philosophical meaning); Robert Weisbuch, James and the Idea
of Evil in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO HENRY JAMES 112 (Jonathan Freedman ed., 1998)
(arguing that "everything [in Portrait] is pointed toward a defining of freedom). Sigi Jottkandt has also
recognized that the novel's overriding concern is "the philosophical problem of Isabel's freedom" in
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landmark American unconscionability cases, Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc.'o and Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.II It suggests
that while Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture was rightly decided,
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors was not.
1. HENNINGSEN V. BLOOMFIELD MOTORS AND WILLIAMS V. WALKER-
THOMAS
In Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Mr. Henningsen purchased a new
Plymouth sedan for his wife as a Mother's Day present. The purchase
order signed by Henningsen was a one-page printed form. On the front of
the page, in small type, it said that the front and back of the form
constituted the entire agreement between the parties. It also stated that the
purchaser had read the back of the form and agreed to it. The back of the
form contained an express warranty from the manufacturer, promising to
replace defective parts within ninety days of the car's purchase and
concluding with the following words: "this warranty being expressly in
lieu of all other warranties expressed or implied, and all other obligations
or liabilities on [the manufacturer's] part."l 2 While Mrs. Henningsen was
driving the car ten days after its delivery, she heard a loud crack from the
bottom of the hood. The steering wheel spun in her hands and the car
crashed, injuring Mrs. Henningsen and wrecking the car. The evidence
was that a mechanical defect or failure caused the accident. At trial, the
claim of negligence against the manufacturer was dismissed. The case
proceeded on the question of whether the manufacturer was liable for
breach of an implied warranty of merchantability-an implied warranty
that the car was fit for use-and for the injuries caused by the breach. In
other words, the question for the New Jersey Court of Appeals was
whether the contract's disclaimers of the warranty of merchantability and
liability for consequential damages were enforceable.
Justice Francis of the New Jersey Court of Appeals began by
acknowledging the general rule that a person is bound by what he signs
even though he has not read the document.' 3 Nevertheless, Justice Francis
thought that two features of this case took it outside the scope of the
general rule. The first was that this was a take-it-or-leave-it standard form
contract in which the purchaser had no real bargaining power and "no real
freedom of choice."'4 The second was the fact that defective cars pose a
grave danger to the public. If we want to minimize the danger, Justice
Francis argued, we have to ensure that the financial burden of defects falls
on those who are in the position to control them. Justice Francis concluded
10. 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
11. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
12. 161 A.2d at 74.
13. Id. at 84.
14. Id. at 94.
[Vol. 27:2216
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that the manufacturer's "attempted disclaimer of an implied warranty of
merchantability and of the obligations arising therefrom is so inimical to
the public good as to compel an adjudication of its invalidity."'
The plaintiff in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Company was
Ora Williams, a single parent of seven children whose only income was a
$218 monthly stipend from the government. From 1957 to 1962 she
purchased sheets, curtains, rugs, chairs, a chest of drawers, beds,
mattresses, and a washing machine, all on credit, from Walker-Thomas
Furniture. In making these purchases, Williams signed a total of fourteen
contracts. Each contract had a paragraph in very fine print. This paragraph
provided that the customer's payments to the balance owed would be pro-
rated on all of the customer's purchases. In other words, until the customer
paid off the amount owing on all the items, a balance would remain due on
each of them. If Williams defaulted on her payments, Walker-Thomas
retained the right to seize all the items she had ever purchased there. There
was also a clause that provided that the transaction between Williams and
Walker-Thomas was a lease rather than a purchase. Although Williams
was taking possession of the items, Walker-Thomas retained title until she
paid off the total value of all the items she had received. In April 1962,
Williams bought a stereo set that was priced at $514.95. At the time of that
purchase, she had made a total of $1400 worth of payments to Walker-
Thomas and the balance still owed on her account was $164. Shortly after
purchasing the stereo, she defaulted on her payments and Walker-Thomas
sought to repossess all the items she had bought since 1957. At trial,
Williams sought to have the contracts she signed with Walker-Thomas
declared unenforceable.
In the lower court,' 6 the judge relied upon a classical understanding of
contractual freedom: a voluntary agreement between competent persons is
sufficient to vary their interpersonal rights and duties.1 7 There was, the
judge found, no evidence of duress, fraud, or mistake in Williams' case. It
was Williams' own responsibility to read the contract and seek outside
help if she found that she could not understand it.'" Since she had
voluntarily signed the contract, the judge found that there were no grounds
for setting aside the bargain. In the Court of Appeals, however, Judge
15. Id. at 95.
16. 198 A.2d 914 (D.C. App. 1964).
17. Richard Epstein, for example, notes that "[t]he classical conception of contract at common
law had as its first premise the belief that private agreements should be enforced in accordance with
their terms . .. there was no place for a court to impose upon the parties its own views about their
rights and duties." Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & ECON.
293, 293 (1975). This was the view the courts took at the time James was writing. As Atiyah writes in
his description of the courts' approach to contracts in the late 1800s: "The justice of the contract, the
fairness of a bargain, was, indeed, not a matter which concerned the courts at all. It was for the parties
to choose their own terms and make their own bargains, and if one chose skillfully while the other
chose foolishly, this was merely the working of the free market system." P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND
FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 389 (1979).
18. 198 A.2d 914 at 916.
2015] 217
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Wright disagreed that fraud, duress, and mistake exhaust the grounds for
setting aside a bargain. He found that a court may refuse to enforce a
contract that it finds unconscionable in the sense that, concluded in the
absence of meaningful choice by one party, it contains terms that are
unreasonably favorable to the other.19
2. CRITICS OF UNCONSCIONABILITY AND FREEDOM AS CHOICE
Henningsen and Walker-Thomas expand the grounds of contractual non-
enforcement to include unconscionability and they have been criticized as
infringements of the classical principle of contractual freedom. The
freedom-based criticism of the doctrine of unconscionability may be
summarized as follows: property law recognizes the individual's exclusive
rights in her person and her property by enforcing rules of non-
interference. Contract law, on its classical understanding, carries to its
logical conclusion the idea that the individual has exclusive rights over her
person and her property by enforcing a regime of contractual freedom.20
Contractual freedom means, first, that absent an agreement, individuals
owe one another no positive obligations. Second, individuals may incur
positive obligations to one another by agreeing to such obligations on the
terms that seem best to them. These freely formed agreements about how
individuals will use and exchange their rights in their persons and property
command respect and are thus enforced through the law of contracts.
Against this background picture of private law, the doctrine of
unconscionability appears problematic. This is so because in invoking the
doctrine the court refuses to enforce the obligations that two responsible
parties have freely agreed to. The court says that the individual is not
under the obligation she chose to assume and therefore doesn't take her
choice to assume it seriously, doesn't take her seriously as a person who
bears responsibility for her own choices. 21 And not only that. Because of
stare decisis the effect of the rulings in Henningsen and Walker-Thomas is
that no party can ever choose to be bound by certain sorts of agreements
no matter how deliberate the choice. No one can choose to accept legally
binding onerous credit terms in exchange for cheaper goods; no one can
choose to forgo a warranty for the sake of obtaining a lower priced car.
The development of the unconscionability doctrine therefore seems to
mean that individuals are no longer free to set the terms of their
interaction. 2 2 The courts become, in Richard Epstein's phrase, "roving
commissions" that "set aside agreements whose substantive terms they
find objectionable." 23 Unconscionability thus appears as an "assault upon
19. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
20. See FRIED, supra note 1, at 2; Barnett, supra note 4, at 292.
21. FRIED, supra note 1, at 20-21.
22. Barnett, supra note 4, at 286.
23. Epstein, supra note 18, at 294.
218 [Vol. 27:2
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private agreements," 24  an "open-ended invitation to rearrange the
understandings people have reached." 25
What of the claim, made by the judges in both Henningsen and Walker-
Thomas, that bargains like the ones made by Henningsen and Williams
should not be enforced because they were made in the absence of
"meaningful choice"?26 On the view of contract law I have been
discussing, this claim is vague and unpersuasive. 27 Classical contract
law-the contract law that preceded the development of the modem
doctrine of unconscionability-already refused to enforce bargains made
under conditions of duress, fraud, or incapacity. 28 Absent these conditions,
what does a lack of "meaningful choice" mean? Does it mean that the
party was faced with limited options? Does it mean that the choice was
motivated by a strong want or need whose satisfaction the party was
unwilling to forgo? Does it mean that the party was blind to the
consequences of her choice? But limited options, choices motivated by
wants and needs given by our physical and psychological makeup, and
blindness to the likely consequences of our choices are all constant
features of the human situation. The consumer who wants to purchase a
certain product in a competitive market has either to pay the market price
or forgo the product, and the seller must demand the market price or else
forgo the sale; 29 our everyday transactions in supermarkets and drugstores
are motivated by needs we did not choose; and every choice we make to
act in a world external to us is a choice made under conditions of
uncertainty about what the consequences of that action will be. If we want
to preserve the idea that human beings are free agents capable of choice
and responsibility, we have to recognize that limited options, internal
motivations, and uncertainty about consequences comprise the
circumstances of choice, the background conditions against which human
beings must shape their lives and make their choices.30 Thus the problem
with unconscionability, on the view we are now considering, is that it is
paternalistic. It fails to treat the individual as an agent capable of leading
her own life-capable, that is, of making her own choices and taking
24. Id.
25. FRIED, supra note 1, at 93.
26. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Henningsen
v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 94 (1960).
27. FRIED, supra note 1, at 104.
28. As Duncan Kennedy notes, the refusal to enforce agreements made under conditions of fraud,
duress or incapacity is not an exception to the idea of free contract but is rather constitutive of the idea
of free contract. See Kennedy, supra note 2, at 577; see also Alan Wertheimer, Unconscionability and
Contracts, 2 BUs. ETHics Q. 479, 484 (1992) ("[1]f unconscionable contracts were involuntary, there
would be no need to develop a principle of unconscionability. The standard defenses could do all the
work").
29. For discussion of this point, see Wertheimer, supra note 29, at 487. For a thorough discussion
of the fact that there is nothing inherently suspect about take-it-or-leave-it standard form terms, see
Douglas Baird, The Boilerplate Puzzle, 104 MICH L. REv. 933 (2006).
30. ROBERT NozICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 263 (1974).
2015]1 219
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responsibility for the consequences.
The critique of unconscionability that I have just elaborated is a critique
based on a certain conception of human freedom. That conception of
human freedom is freedom as the capacity for choice. On this view, the
core meaning of freedom is best expressed in terms of the distinction
between persons and things. A person is capable of determining his or her
own purposes, whereas a thing is something that is used for the purposes
of others. Someone is treated as a person when she is left to make her own
choices; someone is treated as a thing when another person's choices
determine her actions.31 Freedom is here conceived as independence, as
not being subject to the choice of another, and domination is just the
coercion of another's will.32 Moreover, freedom understood as choice or
independence means not only that I am not subject to the choice of any
other person, but also that I set my own purposes. Interests and aims are
not simply given to me by God or nature, leaving me a passive receptacle
with nothing to decide except how best to pursue them. Rather, the
capacity for free choice is the capacity to abstract from and reflect upon
immediate inclination and subjective desire and decide which ends I will
pursue.
The capacity to abstract from particular preferences, interests, and goals
reveals a self that is distinct from its ends, a chooser prior to all the
particular things that might be chosen. This capacity thus reveals a source
of value-the choosing self-that is distinguishable from its empirical
circumstances and prior to all the things that are instrumentally and
contingently valued. Dignity, understood as that which distinguishes the
realm of instrumental value from the realm of ultimate value, resides in
this capacity for choice. On this view, then, freedom is not a good to be
fostered or a goal to be realized. It is simply the abstract capacity for
choice that endows human beings with ultimate worth and commands
respect from everyone.
Freedom so conceived has important implications for private law. Since
(on this view) human beings are treated as persons when they are left to
make their own choices, they cannot be coerced by a law that embodies
the choice of another. In other words, they cannot be coerced by a law that
serves the needs, interests, or ends of other human beings, for this would
make them a means to the pursuit of others' goals. Law's content must
therefore abstract from all particular choices-from all particular needs
and subjective interests-to that which is non-contingently shared by all.
What is non-contingently shared by all is just that feature that
distinguishes human beings from things: the capacity for choice. Human
beings can respect one another's capacity for choice without deferring to
one another's particular choices. They can respect one another's capacity
31. ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM 14 (2009).
32. Id. at 29.
220 [Vol. 27:2
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for choice without becoming a means to one another's ends.33 Private law
is therefore consistent with human freedom when it elaborates the
requirements of mutual respect for free choice. It is inconsistent with
human freedom when it serves a need, interest, or end that is not
universally and identically shared by all.
As we have seen, a consequence of this conception of freedom is that it
leaves no room for the modem doctrine of unconscionability. On the view
I have just been elaborating, the only possible measure of a contract's
fairness is its voluntariness, with voluntariness understood as the absence
of fraud or coercion. All other measures of fairness involve considerations
of the parties' interests, but subjective interests have been excluded as
legitimate grounds of coercive obligation.34 Of course, in cases like those
of Walker-Thomas or Henningsen, there is no question of fraud or
coercion. The contracts were voluntarily signed. The problem, rather, is
that Henningsen and Williams chose to sign contracts with onerous terms,
terms they perhaps did not fully understand. As a result, Henningsen had
to bear the losses caused by a defective vehicle and Williams lost her basic
household items, items she would not be able to replace because of her
extremely limited resources. But from the perspective of a theory that
regards mutual respect for free choice as the sole ground of private law,
these plaintiffs' failure to understand the full implications of their
contracts' terms and their resulting financial hardship do not give rise to
legally recognizable claims. Their choices, though made in unfortunate
circumstances, are their own and the consequences are their burden to
bear.
3. DEFENDERS OF UNCONSCIONABILITY AND FREEDOM AS REALIZED
AUTONOMY
Supporters of the modem doctrine of unconscionability usually justify it
as promoting human welfare. In Taking Preferences Seriously, for
example, Robin West argues that unconscionability responds to situations
where the party seeking non-enforcement has made a bargain that is
contrary to his or her well-being.35 The judge, she argues, "discerns the
individual's true interest by sympathetically 'placing herself in the
individual's shoes' and seeing how it would feel to live with the choices
33. Ernest Weinrib, Right and Advantage in Private Law, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1283, 1287-88
(1989).
34. For this point, see ALAN BRUDNER, THE UNITY OF THE COMMON LAW 132 (1995). James
Gordley also writes: "If value is subjective, then there is no source outside of the agreement of the
parties by which one could judge the fairness of exchange. Interference by a court would not only be
improper but arbitrary." James Gordley, Equality in Exchange, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1587, 1600 (1981);
see also Barnett, supra note 4, at 284 (arguing that a theory of substantive fairness in contract assumes
an objective standard of value, which has yet to be articulated and defended).
35. West, supra note 2, at 696-97.
2015] 221
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that person has made."3 6 On West's interpretation, the judge in Walker-
Thomas concluded that the suffering the credit terms would cause in cases
of default was just too great relative to the benefit derived from the ability
to buy the goods more cheaply. In Duncan Kennedy's formulation, the
unconscionability doctrine is justified as a moral response to false
consciousness. It is a response to buyers' tendency to misinterpret or
ignore information as well as to their willingness to take risks they cannot
afford to take. The judge may use the doctrine to force buyers to give up
the fleeting satisfaction that a commodity, such as a stereo, can bring for
the sake of avoiding financial catastrophe.38 In Anthony Kronman's
slightly different defense of the doctrine, unconscionability is a tool that
allows judges to redistribute material resources from those who have more
to those who have less; the goal is equality of welfare. 3 9
Seana Shiffrin's defense of unconscionability appears quite different.40
She argues that when the state refuses to enforce contracts it finds
unconscionable, it need not necessarily be acting out of concern for the
weaker party's well-being and so need not be acting paternalistically.4 1
Shiffrin's point is that the state's reasons for refusing enforcement may be
reasons relating to its own good, its own moral stature, and not to the good
of the parties to the transaction. The state may simply be refusing to lend
its support to an agreement it finds morally repugnant so as to avoid
implicating itself in immorality.42 But this argument does not succeed. In a
liberal democracy, the good of the state must be the good of its individual
members; the state's interest is the interest of its citizens. When the state
acts or refuses to act, it doesn't do so in the pursuit of a conception of its
own interest in the way that a private individual does; it acts or refuses to
act on the basis of a conception of the interest of its citizens. Thus, just as
Shiffrin understands the enforcement of contracts as a mechanism
whereby the state supports the moral and material well-being of its
members, 4 3 so the refusal of enforcement can have no justification other
than the moral and material well-being of its members. When the state
refuses to enforce an unconscionable contract, it must do so because it
thinks enforcement would be contrary to the real interests of the weaker
party.
But perhaps this reading of Shiffrin's argument treats her discussion of
36. Id. at 676.
37. Id. at 688.
38. Kennedy, supra note 2, at 627.
39. Kronman, supra note 2, at 770.
40. Shiffrin, supra note 7, at 205.
41. Id. at 221-30.
42. Shiffrin, supra note 7, at 221.
43. Shiffrin writes: "I want to begin by taking it for granted that the institution of contract is an
institution in which the community assists people who make agreements by providing a measure of
security for those agreements.... This allows us to cooperate more easily and to secure our common
welfare in a number of respects." Id.
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the state's "self-regarding refusal" to enforce an immoral agreement too
simplistically. Although Shiffrin analogizes from interactions between
private individuals pursuing their own goals and moral commitments to
interactions between the state and its citizens, perhaps she nevertheless
recognizes a fundamental difference between these two forms of
interaction. Perhaps Shiffrin means that when the state acts out of regard
for its own moral stature, it is acting out of regard for the moral well-being
of all its citizens and their interest in the moral stature of the state to which
they are committed. Even on this interpretation, however, the court is
refusing to enforce a contract based on its moral view of what the terms of
the agreement ought to be. The only difference here is that the court does
this, not for the sake of the well-being of the particular parties to the
contract taken in isolation, but for the sake of the moral well-being of the
community as a whole. But although this argument may avoid paternalism
in its defense of unconscionability, it does not avoid moralism. The court
refuses to respect the choices of individual free agents when it thinks that
respect for those choices threatens the moral well-being of all.
Both critics and defenders of the unconscionability doctrine thus agree
that it allows the court to refuse to enforce the parties' agreement on the
basis of the court's moral view of what the terms of their relationship
ought to be. We have seen why the critics regard this as problematic. To
see why the defenders find this unproblematic, we have to understand the
conception of freedom that underlies the defense of unconscionability as a
moral doctrine.
There is a conception of freedom implicit in the moral defense of the
unconscionability doctrine, one that rivals the conception of freedom as
choice." The rival conception of freedom points out that the freedom we
care about must be the freedom, not of philosophical abstractions, but of
real human beings living determinate lives. And what matters for real
human beings living determinate lives is whether or not they are able to
realize their capacity for choice, whether or not their actual lives reflect
their own sense of what would give life point and meaning. Freedom is
thus to be understood as the individual's autonomous flourishing, as living
a life one can regard as one's own, a life that reflects one's deliberative
scheme of commitments and values. But freedom so conceived is an
achievement, a goal, and it may be realized imperfectly or not all. This
sort of freedom may be frustrated by circumstances, such as poverty, or by
the actions of others, particularly by their manipulation of vulnerability.
Realized freedom may also be threatened by the choices individuals make
about their own lives, for not all choices are adequate to the ideal of living
a life that reflects a thought-out scheme of commitments and values. If an
individual enters a relationship in which her agency is subordinated,
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allows herself to be a slave to her moment-to-moment passions or to be
overtaken by an obsession, or turns control of her life over to chance, then
she will have failed to lead a life in which her freedom is realized.
Realized freedom thus has material conditions. It requires a minimum
amount of money and education and the positive support of a moral
community that makes autonomous ways of life possible.
If the realized freedom of all is our goal, this has important implications
for law. Realized freedom requires, not only boundaries of non-
interference, but obligations of care for the autonomy of those united
within law's moral community. Law's focus ought to be, not simply on
protecting people from intrusion by others, but on providing the conditions
of freedom's realization and structuring relationships so as to promote
autonomous flourishing. Where private law's normative foundation is
understood as the achievement of the realized freedom of all, the rights
and duties that govern private transactions must fall out of the
requirements of achieving that goal. Contract law supports autonomy by
facilitating complex interdependence in the achievement of projects and
plans.4 5 Moreover, the unconscionability doctrine is not an exception to
the ordinary rules of contract but merely an extension: if that complex
interdependence in the achievement of projects and plans undermines
rather than promotes autonomy, there is no longer a reason for the law to
act as facilitator. There is nothing problematic from the perspective of
freedom about a court's refusal to enforce an agreement that threatens the
realized freedom of the parties because, on the view we have now been
considering, freedom means realized freedom.
A significant consequence of this understanding of unconscionability's
normative foundation is that there is no reason to respect a transaction
simply because it was voluntarily chosen. Shiffrin, for example, writes:
"We are not compelled to further (or to make possible) the projects of
promisors, just because those agents act freely."4 6 West goes further: "The
morality of any of these consensual transactions depends upon the value of
the worlds they create, which in turn depends in part upon the worth of the
relationships they contain." 47 This means that on this account of
unconscionability, there is no room for an exception for one who, with full
knowledge and understanding of what she is doing, enters a contract that
is contrary to the authoritative conception of her moral well-being. There
is no room for an exception for someone who, with independent advice
and full knowledge and understanding of the contract's terms, chooses to
take the risk of the burdensome terms in exchange for cheaper goods.48
45. See Shiffrin, supra note 7, at 221.
46. Id. at 222.
47. Robin West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral and
Political Visions ofFranz Kalka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REv. 384, 399
48. Shiffrin writes that the unconscionability doctrine may apply even when "these contracts are
made voluntarily, by responsible agents, and under conditions of sufficient information." Shiffrin,
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For West and Kennedy, for example, no one can be permitted to risk that
suffering. A willingness to do so simply reflects a false consciousness that
calls for a paternalist intervention in the name of that individual's well-
being. Since realized autonomy has replaced free choice as the meaning of
freedom, the autonomy-based account of unconscionability permits a
judge to overrule the fully informed choices of human beings capable of
rational deliberation when their choices threaten their autonomous
flourishing.
All this brings us to the following conclusion: Freedom as individual
choice gives us a contract law that has no room for a doctrine of
unconscionability and freedom as the realized autonomy of all gives us a
rich doctrine of unconscionability that undermines the individual's
freedom to choose. The questions we must now ask are: what, if anything,
is wrong with a contract law that protects the individual's freedom to
choose but fails to recognize a doctrine of unconscionability? What, if
anything, is wrong with a doctrine of unconscionability that protects
human welfare but pays no respect to their free choices? As I hope to
show, James' The Portrait of a Lady offers a new way of thinking about
these perennially troubling issues of private law.4 9
4. ISABEL'S WORLDVIEW: FREEDOM AS CHOICE
The features of Isabel Archer's moral character that are most
emphasized in the first half of the novel are the importance she attaches to
her own freedom and the real firmness with which she guards it. Isabel
regards the world as a place "of free expansion, of irresistible action.""o
To her suitor, Caspar Goodwood, she says: "If there's a thing in the world
I'm fond of ... it's my personal independence."" If we consider how
Isabel understands freedom, we first notice that it means for her the
rejection of all that is "stupidly conventional,"52 in particular of
conventional views about what a woman ought to do with her life. We
thus find Isabel refusing two marriage proposals in the first part of the
novel and, though regretful of the pain she causes, rejoicing in the way her
rejection of men "nineteen women out of twenty"53 would have accepted
seems proof of her freedom-of her capacity to reject the influence of
supra note 7, at 209.
49. As Atiyah's history of contract law suggests, the ideas that underlie the doctrine of
unconscionability were in the air when James was writing. Oxford political thinker T.H. Green
delivered his lecture on Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract in 1881, arguing that: "To
uphold the sanctity of contracts is doubtless a prime business of government, but it is no less its
business to provide against contracts being made, which from the helplessness of one of the parties to
them, instead of being a security for freedom become an instrument of disguised oppression." See
WORKS OF T. H. GREEN (R.L. Nettleship ed., 1888) cited in ATIYAH, supra note 18, at 585.
50. JAMES, supra note 8, at 53.
51. Id. at 140.
52. Id. at 59.
53. Id. at 101.
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convention in shaping her life.54
Whereas other women in the novel are likened to empty vessels or blank
slatess, Isabel is most frequently imagined as the bird in flight or the ship
at sea. Isabel is "as free as the bird on the bough" 6 , has "wings and the
need of free beautiful movements."57 Her friend Henrietta describes Isabel
as "drifting away-right out to sea"s and her cousin Ralph wishes "to put
a little wind in her sails" so that he might "see her going before the
breeze."" Of course, the bird in flight and the ship at sea are both images
of detachment from land. They are metaphors for one who manages to
transcend social conventions, to float unmoored from oppressive
customary norms. They are also images of movement, activity, suggesting
Isabel's refusal of the attitude of passivity and her rejection of the idea that
her agency is porous to external impositions. Isabel is determined to shape
a life that she can regard as her own because it is the one that she has
chosen.
As we consider Isabel's character more carefully, however, we see that
her rejection of the shaping influence of convention is part of a larger self-
conception, and that is her conviction of self-sufficiency. The refusal of
dependence on other things or other people-on anything outside
herself-is an important part of what Isabel means when she insists upon
her freedom. Thus, we first meet her as a young woman without parents or
property, pointedly warning Ralph that she is "not a candidate for
adoption"60 , believing that "one should try to be one's own best friend,"6 1
and that she has an "orbit of her own."62 We see that Isabel keeps her
distance from other human beings, acknowledging no need of them. While
she displays a keen interest in others, her interest is the interest of a
detached observer. She thinks of other people as "specimens"63 and her
desire to know them seems just a part of her general desire for knowledge
of human behavior. Moreover, Isabel is constantly "planning out her
development, desiring her perfection, observing her progress."' We notice
that she views her development, perfection, and progress as all of her own
54. The rejection of Lord Warburton's marriage proposal gives Isabel a "sweet. . feeling of
freedom." Id. at 125.
55. Madame Merle is the empty cup with a crack in it Id. at 428; Pansy is "like a sheet of blank
paper" Id. at 233, "a blank page, a pure white surface" Id. at 262, "transparent" Id. at 343; the
Countess Gemini is "a bright rare shell.. .in which something would rattle when you shook it." Id. at
368.
56. Id. at 187.
57. Id. at 140-1. She seems to her cousin Ralph to be "soaring far up in the blue," "sailing in the
bright light, over the heads of men" Id. at 285; and he encourages her to "[slpread. . . [her] wings; rise
above the ground." Id. at 189.
58. Id. at 108.
59. Id. at 158-59.
60. Id. at 29.
61. Id. at 53.
62. Id. at 94.
63. Id. at 64.
64. Id. at 55.
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making, and that her sense of worth requires for its confirmation nothing
more than an exercise in introspection. Believing that her happiness
requires nothing beyond her control, Isabel even thinks that her "fate" is
something she will "choose."65
Finally, we must notice the real note of fear, even of terror, in Isabel's
reactions to her suitors' declarations of love. The thought of a marriage
proposal from Lord Warburton fills Isabel with a "certain alarm"66 and the
coldness of her response, the narrator tells us, comes from fear.67 She
reacts to Lord Warburton's proposal as "some wild, caught creature in a
vast cage"68 and views Caspar Goodwood as a man "naturally plated and
steeled, armed essentially for aggression." 9 This fear we find in Isabel's
reactions to declarations of love cannot simply be explained by her
unwillingness to make a conventional marriage, for in that case we would
expect her to find these proposals merely unwelcome, annoying but not
terrifying. The reason for Isabel's fear, I think, is that love implies a need
for something beyond oneself, and marriage appears to be a confession of
the individual's incompleteness. Because love threatens the conviction of
self-sufficiency and the idea of an invulnerable agency, it is incompatible
with Isabel's conviction that she has "an orbit of her own." 70 For not only
does love seem to be something that happens to us rather than something
we choose, but in loving another, we make our happiness and the shape of
our lives vulnerable to the agency of a person who is beyond our control.
This, perhaps, is the meaning of the similarity Isabel feels between loving
someone and spending a sum of money once stored safely in a bank; the
agency that was once carefully guarded and invulnerable is, in loving
another, porous, no longer safely protected.
We now begin to see the connection between freedom and the
conviction of self-sufficiency. The self-sufficient agent is free because a
life that requires nothing external to it is a life that is fully under that
agent's control. To acknowledge the need of something external-
particularly another human being-is to acknowledge that one's life is not
purely self-authored. A life whose completion requires others is a life that
is necessarily dependent upon, and so shaped and influenced by, the others
that one needs, others that are beyond one's control. Freedom, for Isabel,
thus excludes the possibility of such neediness; she thinks that to be free is
to be self-sufficient. Isabel's rejection of the authority and shaping
influence of conventional norms may thus be understood as an aspect of
her more general conviction of self-sufficiency, her general rejection of
the influence or need of anything external.
65. Id. at 141.
66. Id. at 93.
67. Id. at 77.
68. Id. at 99.
69. Id. at 136.
70. Id. at 94.
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I want now to suggest, however, that Isabel's sense of her own self-
sufficiency is part of an idea that is still more foundational in her
conception of freedom-the idea that freedom is nothing more than the
freedom "to choose." 7' This idea of freedom is connected to a particular
theory of human personality, which Isabel articulates in the following
often-quoted exchange with Madame Merle:
"I don't care anything about his house," said Isabel.
"That's very crude of you. When you've lived as long as I you'll
see that every human being has his shell and that you must take the
shell into account. By the shell I mean the whole envelope of
circumstances. There's no such thing as an isolated man or
woman; we're each of us made up of some cluster of
appurtenances. What shall we call our 'self'? Where does it begin?
Where does it end? It overflows into everything that belongs to
us-and then it flows back again. I know a large part of myself is
the clothes I choose to wear. I've a great respect for things! One's
self-for other people-is one's expression of one's self; and
one's house, one's furniture, one's garments, the books one reads,
the company one keeps-these things are all expressive."
This was very metaphysical; not more so, however, than several
observations Madame Merle had already made. Isabel was fond of
metaphysics, but was unable to accompany her friend into this bold
analysis of the human personality. "I don't agree with you. I think
just the other way. I don't know whether I succeed in expressing
myself, but I know that nothing else expresses me. Nothing that
belongs to me is any measure of me; everything's on the contrary a
limit, a barrier, and a perfectly arbitrary one. Certainly the clothes
which, as you say, I choose to wear, don't express me; and heaven
forbid they should!"
"You dress very well," Madame Merle lightly interposed.
"Possibly; but I don't care to be judged by that. My clothes may
express the dressmaker, but they don't express me. To begin with
it's not my own choice that I wear them; they're imposed upon me
by society."72
Isabel's theory of personality is here juxtaposed with its opposite.
Madame Merle regards the self as entirely bound up with the public world
and its identity as inseparable from its things, preferences, and
circumstances. For Madame Merle, the idea of one's own life is
indistinguishable from "one's appearance, one's movements, one's
71. Id. at 67. The idea of choice thus resonates throughout the first half of the novel. "I can do
what I choose," Isabel insists. Id. at 141; "The world lay before her-she could do whatever she chose.
There was a deep thrill in it all . . ." Id. at 267. Others have noticed the centrality of the idea of choice
in this novel. See, e.g., Jottkandt, supra note 9, at 70.
72. Id. at 172-173.
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engagements, one's society."73 Isabel disagrees. She argues that none of
these things constitutes the essential self, for they are all arbitrary. Nothing
that simply "belongs" to her is her; she insists upon a distinction between
what she is and what she merely has, what is her and what is merely
hers.7 4 We see elsewhere that Isabel includes among the things she merely
has, the things that are merely hers, not only her clothing and other
material possessions, but all the features of her history and circumstance,
her values and her beliefs. Thus she has a constant desire to "begin afresh"
and thinks that she can "leave the past behind her."" Moreover, Isabel's
sense that her values and beliefs are not essential features of her person
explains, I think, why she seems to efface herself when she first meets
Gilbert Osmond, minimizing the importance of her own ideas and moral
commitments.76
Isabel thus conceives of human personality as an abstract, essential self
that is separable from its circumstances, relations, and all the determinate
features of its character. 77 The idea that the essential self is undetermined
means that human beings are capable of self-determination; they are not
the passive victims of circumstances or the receptacles of impulses given
by nature. The idea that the essential self is distinct from its relations and
circumstances means that human beings are separate persons, bounded
rather than porous." Because they are separate and capable of self-
determination, human beings are inviolable moral agents and bearers of
absolute worth. The moral agent refuses to be used as the tool of others'
purposes, assumes responsibility for her actions, and treats others with the
respect that other, equally free, moral agents deserve; she regards them as
free and dignified persons, not as objects ministering to her ends or as
needy victims requiring her care.
Justice is thus central in Isabel's thinking.79 She has a "passionate desire
73. Id. at 201.
74. For a discussion of this distinction in relation to conceptions of the self, see MICHAEL
SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 55 (1998).
75. JAMES, supra note 8, at 39.
76. This is what Isabel later realizes: "She had effaced herself when [Osmond] first knew her; she
had made herself small, pretending there was less of her than there really was." Id. at 350.
77. Philip Sicker describes this feature of Isabel's theory of the self as the idea that identity "is a
mystically elusive property of individual consciousness" in LOVE AND THE QUEST FOR IDENTITY IN
THE FICTION OF HENRY JAMES 54-55 (1980). Arnold Kettle writes that freedom, for Isabel, is "an
abstract quality inherent in the individual soul." KETTLE, supra note 9, at 28. On this view, no
alteration in one's external circumstances, attachments or preferences can alter the essential self.
Osmond also expresses this view in conversation with Madame Merle: "Don't you know the soul is an
immortal principle? How can it suffer alteration?" JAMES, supra note 8, at 427.
78. Isabel the American thus shares the conception of human freedom as "boundary" that Jennifer
Nedelsky argues was the central metaphor for the framers of the U.S. Constitution. See Jennifer
Nedelsky, Law, Boundaries, and the Bounded Self, 30 REPRESENTATIONS 162 (1990).
79. "Whatever happens tome let me not be unjust," she said; "let me bear my burdens myself and
not shift them upon others." JAMES, supra note 8, at 333. Isabel has a spirit that wishes always "to
hold fast to justice" and a "general determination to be just." Id. at 333-334. Adam Parkes points out
that justice is a central theme in Portrait that has largely been neglected by critics in A Sense of
Justice: Whistler, Ruskin, James, Impressionism, 42 VICTORIAN STUD. 593, 611 (1999-2000).
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to be just,"s and insists upon the same treatment for herself: "I want to be
treated with justice; I want nothing but that."8 1 It might be noticed,
however, that Madame Merle also insists upon justice, telling Isabel that
"[j]ustice is all [she] want[s]." 82 For Madame Merle, however, to ask for
justice is to ask for sympathy", for mercy in the face of neediness, and we
see that justice means something very different to Isabel. When Lord
Warburton speaks to her in the language of love, for example, Isabel
responds with the language of justice: "'I care nothing for Gardencourt,'
said her companion. 'I care only for you."' "'You've known me too short
a time to have a right to say that,"'84 Isabel responds. She later promises,
in considering his proposal, to "do it justice."" By doing the proposal
justice, however, Isabel means only that she will find some way to reject
the proposal while treating Lord Warburton with the respect he deserves;
she does not mean that she will make his neediness, the fact that his
happiness is in her hands, a reason for action on her part." Similarly,
Isabel informs Caspar Goodwood that he has "no right to talk of losing
what's not [his]"'87 and insists that she can't marry Caspar simply to
please him." Justice, for Isabel, is the idea that each person is a moral
agent entitled to respect for her dignified freedom. This respect requires a
kind of distance between persons, a distance that affirms their
inviolability, agency, and self-sufficiency.89 Isabel's sense of justice is the
Kantian idea of rightful honor, the readiness to assert one's own claims
and the willingness to acknowledge a like entitlement in other human
beings.90 Ralph thus notices in Isabel an impenetrable, edifice-like
quality,9 1 and Lord Warburton senses that in her relations with others,
Isabel bestows "stern justice" 92 rather than love, and judges "only from the
outside," without care.93
In contrast to the distance Isabel maintains between herself and others,
80. JAMES, supra note 8, at 284.
81. Id. at 188.
82. Id. at 170.
83. Parkes, supra note 82, at 611.
84. JAMES, supra note 8, at 96.
85. Id. at 99.
86. Id. at 99 and 102.
87. Id. at 135.
88. Id. at 137.
89. Thus we notice that Isabel has a deep respect for the private. Henrietta thinks "one's door
should stand ajar," id. at 86, but Ralph finds Isabel impenetrable: "He surveyed the edifice from the
outside and admired it greatly; he looked in at the windows and received an impression of proportions
equally fair. But he felt that he saw it only by glimpses and that he had not yet stood under the roof.
The door was fastened, and though he had keys in his pocket he had a conviction that none of them
would fit." Id. at 63.
90. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Mary Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge
University Press 1996) (1797).
91. JAMES, supra note 8, at 63.
92. Id. at 76.
93. Id. at 77.
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Madame Merle's self, as Osmond says, "includes so many other selves-
so much of every one else and of everything."94 But where human
personality is conceived as inseparable from its things, circumstances, and
relations, there can be no idea of a self that commands respect for its
agency and makes claims to inviolability. Thus, rather than shaping a life
of her own, Madame Merle allows herself to function as the tool of others'
purposes: "She laid down her pastimes as easily as she took them up; she
worked and talked at the same time, and appeared to impute scant worth to
anything she did. She gave away her sketches and tapestries; she rose from
the piano or remained there, according to the convenience of her auditors,
which she always unerringly divined."' Madame Merle is the porcelain
pot, "shockingly chipped and cracked,"96 the empty teacup with a crack in
it.97 These are images suggesting hollowness, utility, and violation.
Moreover, just as Madame Merle is herself lacking in dignity, her
conception of the self leaves nothing to which a sense of responsibility to
others could attach and gives her no reason to regard others as dignified,
inviolable subjects. Willing to be treated as a means to others' ends, she
finds no reason not to treat others as means to her own ends: "I don't
pretend to know what people are meant for," she declares; "I only know
what I can do with them." 98
We thus begin to see that Isabel's theory of human personality is also a
theory of human freedom. The idea that the self is not constituted by its
circumstances, its relations with others, or by the impulses, preferences,
and goals that are given to it by nature or convention means that human
beings are choosers, free agents, actively willing their circumstances and
preferences and not simply being made by them. They choose to follow
particular impulses; they choose to adopt certain commitments and goals.
Isabel's conception of personality is thus a conception of freedom as the
capacity for choice. It is freedom as the capacity to stand apart from our
concrete values, goals, relations, impulses, preferences, and
circumstances, regarding them as "arbitrary"99 or only contingently ours,
ours only because we have chosen them.'
We can now see, moreover, that this understanding of freedom is the
basis for Isabel's rejection of the influence of conventional values and for
her conviction of self-sufficiency. The rejection of the conventional is, for
Isabel, evidence of her freedom to reject external influences upon her
94. Id. at 201.
95. Id. at 165.
96. Id. at 166.
97. Id. at 428.
98. Id. at 203.
99. Id. at 172.
100. In conversation with Henrietta, Ralph expresses a contrary view of human personality: "Ah,
one doesn't give up one's country any more than one gives up one's grandmother. They're both
antecedent to choice-elements of one's composition that are not to be eliminated." Id. at 84.
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choice and action, evidence that she is the agent of her life and not a
passive conduit for the dictates of convention. Isabel thus informs her aunt
that she "always want[s] to know the things one shouldn't do," "so as to
choose" whether or not she will do them.or Freedom as choice and the
conviction of self-sufficiency are connected as well. Human beings with
concrete needs, preferences, and goals are dependent upon other human
beings for care and assistance in fulfilling them. As we noted earlier, such
dependency challenges the agent's freedom, for it challenges her control
over the shape of her life. But when the self is conceived in abstraction
from such needs, preferences, and goals, when these things are regarded as
inessential, as mere choices capable of repudiation, then dependency also
becomes inessential. It too is a choice rather than part of the core that
constitutes human personality. Abstract personality, having no determinate
needs, preferences, or goals, is self-sufficient.
As we have seen, Isabel's rejection of the conventional and her
conviction of self-sufficiency go some way toward explaining her
rejection of the marriage proposals of Caspar Goodwood and Lord
Warburton. Her broader conception of freedom as the capacity for choice
sheds further light on her actions. Isabel's rejection of the marriage
proposals of Lord Warburton and Caspar Goodwood may be viewed, not
only as her rejection of these particular men, but also as characteristic of
her general attitude toward life. This attitude might be described as one of
negation, an attitude for which any commitment can only be viewed as a
limitation of one's capacity for perfect liberty, one's capacity for "free
expansion."l02 When the essential self is conceived in abstraction from
concrete choices and when freedom is conceived as the possibility of
choice, any definite commitment threatens the self's indeterminacy and
looks like a restriction of its freedom. We have already noted that the
images associated with Isabel, the bird in flight and the ship at sea, are
images of detachment from social convention. They are, however, also
images of restless movement, suggesting detachment, not only from a
conventional way of life, but from any particular way of life. They thus
suggest to us the way Isabel's insistence upon the freedom to choose is an
insistence upon a certain capacity-choice-and not itself a commitment
to any particular thing. Isabel rejects conventional ideas about what
constitutes a good life, not in favor of some other conception of that life,
but in favor of sheer indeterminacy. She falls in love with "suddenly
perceived possibilities, with the idea of some new adventure."o3 Isabel's
aspiration to freedom is in this sense content-less. She rejects her suitors'
101. Id. at 67.
102. For this point see PIPPIN, supra note 9, at 132. See also Tony Tanner, The Fearful Self
Henry James's the Portrait of a Lady, 7 CRITICAL Q. 205, 207 (1965) (arguing that Isabel's "most
characteristic response in the real world is one of refusal and rejection").
103. JAMES, supra note 8, at 330.
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proposals simply because she doesn't want to be "tied"'" or to "give up
other chances."'05 Isabel's idea of freedom is thus emptily abstract and
formal. Focused as it is on sheer capacity or potential, her conception of
freedom abstracts from actual engagement with, or commitment to, the
concrete.
5. ISABEL'S MISTAKE: THE PROBLEM WITH CHOICE
We have thus far developed a picture of Isabel's early conception of
freedom. We saw it first as the rejection of passivity before the shaping
influence of conventional expectations and then as the broader rejection of
any dependence on external things beyond one's control. Finally, we saw
that beneath this conviction of self-sufficiency is a conception of the self
as abstract personality and of freedom as the capacity for choice. Here, as
I have suggested, the essential self is conceived as prior to, and capable of
standing apart from, its concrete choices and determinate relations and
circumstances, dignified in its free agency and noble in its moral
responsibility.
Readers, particularly modern readers, must admire Isabel's ideal. 06 But
as we consider Isabel's thought and action more carefully, I think we must
also begin to sense, not merely that something has gone wrong with the
realization of that ideal here, but that there are flaws inherent in the ideal
itself.
When freedom is conceived as the capacity for choice-the capacity to
accept or reject external influences-all choices appear equal because all
are equally reflective of that capacity. We have already noted that Isabel
rejects the conventional view of the good life, not in favor of some other
particular view, but in favor of sheer indeterminacy. The result of her
refusal of commitment, of her failure to order her life according to some
principles, values, or goals, is that Isabel's choices have nothing for their
content but "capricious forces" 07 and "happy impulse." 08 But while it is
true that all choices are equally reflective of the capacity to choose,
something seems to have gone wrong here. The difficulty is implicit in the
following exchange between Isabel and Henrietta. "Do you know where
you're drifting?" Henrietta asks. "No, I haven't the least idea, and I find it
very pleasant not to know," Isabel replies. "A swift carriage, of a dark
night, rattling with four horses over roads that one can't see-that's my
idea of happiness."'0 9 The swift carriage rattling over roads one can't see
is an image of indeterminacy and unfettered movement, but it is not an
104. Id. at 133.
105. Id. at 117.
106. Id. at 53. Pippin makes this point as well. See PIPPIN, supra note 9, at 132.
107. JAMES, supra note 8, at 40.
108. This point is also made by Jottkandt. See Jottkandt, supra note 9, at 72.
109. JAMES, supra note 8, at 144.
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image of a thinking agent shaping a life for itself. It is rather, an image of
a person being blindly pulled along by her impulses. Similarly, during her
travels in Europe, we find Isabel in "the vagueness of unrest,"o her action
reflecting restlessness and "incoherence." As she acquires an increased
sense of "the absolute boldness and wantonness of liberty,""' Isabel
moves "rapidly and recklessly. . .like a thirsty person draining cup after
cup."l"2 This is another image that suggests, not the freedom of thought
and reflection required for deliberately shaping a life of one's own, but the
power of impulses that are simply presented to us by nature.
Living by immediate impulse is unproblematic from the perspective of
choice since it remains true that one could have rejected the impulse had
one thought about it. And yet, so long as one acts as a conduit for ends
externally given (in this case, by nature), we can say that one is poorly
realizing the human potential for shaping a life in accordance with self-
chosen ends, in other words, for shaping a life of one's own. Thus, during
her restless travels in Europe, Isabel finally discovers that there is no
dignity in "[d]oing all the vain things one likes,"' 3 and the narrator tells
us that there has been an important change in Isabel's worldview: "[t]he
desire for unlimited expansion had been succeeded in her soul by the sense
that life was vacant without some private duty that might gather one's
energies to a point."I14 Isabel sees that a life that can be viewed as
genuinely one's own is a life that reflects a scheme of commitments
chosen upon reflection, and not merely the capacity for choice; for that
capacity turns out to be consistent with a life lived in accordance with
whatever impulses and whims are given to us by our nature.
Isabel's marriage to Gilbert Osmond introduces a further problem with
freedom conceived as the bare freedom to choose. All readers of James'
novel must feel that there is an important sense in which Isabel's marriage
to Osmond is contrived by others. Ralph persuades his father to leave
Isabel a large inheritance, partly out of concern for Isabel, but also for his
own amusement."' Isabel's fortune attracts Madame Merle, who wants to
put it in the hands of her former lover-Osmond-so that it might serve as
their daughter Pansy's dowry. But Madame Merle does not tell Isabel that
Osmond is her former lover and that she knows him to be cold and
heartless; she does not tell Isabel that Pansy is her daughter, and that she
brings Osmond and Isabel together, not out of concern for Isabel's well-
being, but only for her own purposes. Madame Merle and Osmond make
Isabel a cog in their plan, and so fail to treat her as a human being with a
mind and life of her own. As Isabel finally realizes, "she had been an
110. Id. at 265.
111. Id. at 267.
112. Id. at 268.
113. Id. at 257.
114. Id. at 291.
115. Id. at 159.
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applied handled hung-up tool, as senseless and convenient as mere shaped
wood and iron."ll 6 And yet it is also important to notice that when Isabel
says that her choice of Osmond was perfectly free, she is not entirely
wrong. For there was no coercion here and of course, Isabel could have
chosen otherwise; she decided to marry Osmond in the face of her
family's repeated warnings of his selfishness because she was in love with
him. Nevertheless, Isabel's decision to marry Osmond, though the product
of a free choice, is the result of others' manipulation of her and their
exploitation of her innocence and vulnerability for their own ends,
whether only carelessly in the case of Ralph or maliciously in the cases of
Osmond and Madame Merle. Thus, a life in which one's choices are
manipulated by others, in which one's vulnerabilities are exploited for the
purposes of others, turns out to be perfectly consistent with the presence of
the bare capacity to choose, for that capacity is nothing but a fact of
human consciousness, the bare possibility of choosing something else.
That, however, is surely a problem for the conception of freedom as the
capacity for choice, for it is a conception that was based on the difference
between persons and things, on the idea that a person is a dignified agent
and not to be used as an instrument for the purposes of others.
This suggests the following: where freedom is conceived as the abstract
capacity for choice, the sheer capacity for negation, freedom is nothing but
a fact of consciousness that has no worldly reality. The presence of the
capacity for choice is as compatible with a life whose shape reflects
fleeting impulses or the purposes of others as it is with a life whose shape
reflects one's own thought-out values and commitments. But if the
freedom of human beings and not merely the freedom of philosophical
abstractions is our ideal, then our understanding of freedom must include a
conception of its realization in lived human lives. The reality of human
freedom depends not merely on the presence of an abstract capacity, but
on the realization of that capacity in our concrete lives. It depends, in
other words, on our ability to lead lives that we can regard as our own.
But once we see that human freedom entails a life that meaningfully
realizes the capacity for choice, we begin to undermine the picture of
human independence and self-sufficiency that was so closely linked to the
freedom to choose. In Osmond we see that the effort to lead lives that we
can regard as our own makes us dependent. Osmond is poor. He has "no
property, no title, no honours, no houses, or lands, nor position, nor
reputation, nor brilliant belongings of any sort.""' Yet the life he can
regard as a life of his own choosing is one dedicated to art and beauty.
What we see in The Portrait ofa Lady is that human freedom, because it is
not merely a fact of consciousness or quality of the human soul, has
material conditions. It requires money. Without a minimum amount of
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money, we are forced to live our lives meeting the needs that are simply
given to us by nature-our needs for food, clothing, and shelter-and so
cannot shape lives that reflect a self-chosen conception of what we want to
do and who we want to be. Osmond's way of life, and so his freedom,
depends on money and because he doesn't have any, he depends on Isabel.
He is not the self-sufficient chooser he pretends to be. But that, James
seems to suggest, is not because something has gone wrong with the
realization of that ideal in this particular case; it is because the ideal itself
is not one befitting the lives of human beings.
6. ISABEL'S REVISED WORLDVIEW: FREEDOM AS SELF-UNDERSTANDING
In Chapter 51, Isabel receives a telegram from her Aunt Lydia: "Ralph
cannot last many days.. .and if convenient would like to see you. Wishes
me to say that you must come only if you've no other duties. Say, for
myself, that you used to talk a good deal about your duty and to wonder
what it was; shall be curious to see whether you've found it out.""1 The
Portrait of a Lady concludes as Isabel decides to return to her marriage
after visiting Ralph on his deathbed in open defiance of her husband's
wishes. We thus arrive at the question that has most troubled readers and
puzzled critics of James' novel: why does Isabel return to Osmond? Why
does she return to the house she now acknowledges as the "house of
darkness, the house of dumbness, the house of suffocation"?"' What
conception of duty, we must now ask, is reflected in this decision and
what is its relation to the conception of freedom we have thus far been
exploring?
Many critics have tried to understand Isabel's return to Osmond as a
philosophic triumph, a triumph of freedom. They have argued that when
Isabel returns to Osmond, she chooses him for a second time, this time
with eyes open. Thus, they argue, the novel ends with Isabel finally
becoming truly free, free because she freely chooses her "determined
status." 2 o But this reading, I think, faces at least two difficulties. The first
is that it fits uncomfortably with the ordinary reader's experience of the
novel's ending as a tragedy. Isabel, once vibrant and brimming with youth,
confident in her worth and dignity, full of ideas about her own freedom
and determined to shape a valuable life she can regard as her own, in the
end returns to a man who is cold, selfish, and-as we see in his final
118. Id. at 436.
119. Id.at353.
120. Jottkandt refers to this as Isabel's "free choice of her determined status." See Jottkandt,
supra note 9, at 80. She further writes, "If, as Isabel now discovers, her first choice had been unfree,
her decision to choose the same choice again might be conceived as a remaking of that first choice."
Id. Robert Weisbuch also explains Isabel's final decision in terms of free choice: ". . the magic of
James's art here is to make freedom meaningfully itself only when it confronts-and even may appear
like-necessity. Isabel chooses to make her world." Robert Weisbuch, James and the American
Sacred, 22 HENRY JAMES REV. 217, 226 (2001).
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banishment of Pansy to the prison of the convent-evil. Life with
Osmond, we know, is "a dark, narrow alley with a dead wall at the
end"I 2 1; his house is one of "darkness," "dumbness," and "suffocation"' 2 2
and it is thus hard to see Isabel's final decision as something other than a
kind of suicide. To interpret the novel's end as a triumph of freedom is to
transform James' novel into an allegory, so that Isabel's final decision to
return to Osmond becomes nothing but a symbol for something else. But
this is to ignore the way James has, in Isabel Archer, given us a concrete
human subject and asked us to regard her with the sympathetic attention of
a friend. The reader of James' novel cares for Isabel's happiness, is
concerned with her particular suffering, and so cannot regard her
individual pain as a moral triumph.
There is a second difficulty with reading Isabel's final decision as a
triumph of choice. This reading misses the change in Isabel in the years
following her marriage. It misses the fact that Isabel's disenchantment
with her husband is at the same time a disenchantment with the ideal of
choice she once embraced. I have argued that in Osmond, Isabel sees that
the dignified freedom of the concrete human being is not a self-sufficient
abstract capacity for choosing, for free choice turns out to be compatible
with a life whose shape reflects the purposes and aims of others.
Moreover, the meaningful realization of the capacity for choice in a life of
one's own has material conditions and these conditions make us needy and
dependent. And so in the years following her marriage to Osmond, we see
an important change in Isabel's self-conception, a change that is most
explicit in the novel's famous Chapter 42, where Isabel sits alone by the
fire late into the night, reflecting, not only on the marriage she has made,
but on the person she is.
As Isabel considers what has gone wrong with her marriage to Osmond,
we see that she acknowledges a much more robust conception of
personality-a richer conception of who she is-than she earlier admitted.
She had effaced herself when he first knew her; she had made
herself small, pretending there was less of her than there really
was.... It was a wonder, perhaps, in view of this, that he didn't
hate her more. She remembered perfectly the first sign he had
given of it-it had been like a bell that was to ring up the curtain
upon the real drama of their life. He said to her one day that she
had too many ideas and that she must get rid of them... . She had
too many ideas for herself; but that was just what one married for,
to share them with someone else. One couldn't pluck them up by
the roots, though of course one might suppress them, be careful not
to utter them.... What he had meant had been the whole thing-
her character, the way she felt, the way she judged. This was what
121. JAMES, supra note 8, at 349.
122. Id. at 353.
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she had kept in reserve; this was what he had not known until he
had found himself-with the door closed behind, as it were-set
down face to face with it. She had a certain way of looking at life
which he took as a personal offence. 123
While Isabel earlier argued with Madame Merle for an abstract
conception of human personality and regarded herself as an abstract will
detachable from its particular circumstances and concrete commitments,
we now see Isabel as a woman deeply touched by her circumstances and
embracing a conception of selfhood inseparable from its values. She now
acknowledges that she has a worldview, a distinct character, a way of
feeling and judging, and that these features of her personality cannot
simply be "pluck[ed].. .up by the roots."l 2 4 As she finds that she cannot
simply give up her ideas, cannot judge things as Osmond judges them,
cannot see the world as Osmond sees it, Isabel realizes that in conceiving
of her essential self as "unencumbered,"l25 nothing but the abstract
capacity for choice, she had "effaced herself.. .made herself small,
pretending there was less of her than there really was."l 2 6 Isabel now
discovers that she has a history, a "vital principle,"1 27 and a conception of
what it is to be a moral, responsible, and dignified human being. Now
Isabel recognizes that her moral ideas are part of her essential nature,
commitments she cannot stand apart from or regard as merely contingent,
and cannot forsake while remaining herself.128
Moreover, while Isabel once insisted upon her essential separateness
from others-Ralph compared her to an edifice to which he couldn't find
the key-she now seems to see herself as an inseparable part of a larger
whole:
[In old Rome].. .she dropped her secret sadness into the silence of
lonely places, where its very modem quality detached itself and
grew objective, so that as she sat in a sun-warmed angle on a
winter's day, or stood in a mouldy church to which no one came,
she could almost smile at it and think of its smallness. Small it
was, in the large Roman record, and her haunting sense of the
continuity of the human lot easily carried her from the less to the
greater.... [S]he had grown to think of [Rome] chiefly as the
place where people had suffered. This was what came to her in the
starved churches, where the marble columns, transferred from
pagan ruins, seemed to offer her a companionship in endurance
123. Id. at 350-52.
124. Id.at 351.
125. This is Sandel's phrase. See Michael Sandcl, The Procedural Republic and the
Unencumbered Self 12 POL. THEORY 81 (1984).
126. JAMES, supra note 8, at 350.
127. Id. at 349.
128. See Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts, and Possibilities, I
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 7, 10 (1989), for the idea that "one's own law" is something we "find" and
"recognize" rather than something we "choose."
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and the musty incense to be a compound of long-unanswered
prayers. There was no gentler nor less consistent heretic than
Isabel; the firmest of worshippers, gazing at dark altar-pictures or
clustered candles, could not have felt more intimately the
suggestiveness of these objects nor have been more liable at such
moments to a spiritual visitation.' 2 9
No longer conceiving of herself as wholly separate and bounded, Isabel
senses among the Roman ruins and in the ancient churches "the continuity
of the human lot." Her personal suffering seems to speak of universal
suffering and so of universal human aspirations and needs. In Rome,
Isabel sees herself as a person in history, the question of who she is
expanding beyond her personal attachments and values to the question of
her place in the world and her relation to other human beings.1 30
We saw earlier that the abstract conception of the person was also a
conception of human freedom. The idea that the self is not constituted by
its circumstances and relations, or by the impulses, preferences, and goals
that are given to it by nature or convention means that human beings are
free agents, actively willing their circumstances and preferences and not
simply being made by them. The abstract self is free in the sense that she
holds the world at bay and then chooses freely from a position of critical
detachment. Isabel's revised conception of her self as partly constituted by
its attachments, moral values, circumstances, and relations is also
implicitly a conception of what it means to be a free agent, what it means
to shape a life of one's own. When we see Isabel during her midnight
meditation, reflecting on the moral commitments that make up her identity
and the circumstances that have shaped her character, we see her in "a
passion of thought, of speculation, of response to every pressure."' 3 ' Her
mind, the narrator tells us, is in "a state of extraordinary activity"l 32 as she
tries to work out an understanding of who she is, of which relations,
circumstances, and values are central to her being, of how she should think
about her life and her obligations to others, and what she should do in light
of this deeper understanding of her self. We must see this as an expression
of agency. It is agency conceived as a process of thought and reflection
that begins with the recognition of one's immersion in the world-in
relations, circumstances, values-and then asks, who am I? Which
relations, circumstances, and values are central and constitutive,
distinguishing me as a separate human being and making me the particular
person that I am? Isabel expresses her agency here, not by denying her
constitutive nature, but by reflecting upon it, endorsing it as her own, and
129. JAMES, supra note 8, at 423.
130. Joel Porte writes of Isabel's "increasing awareness of herself as a contingent creature with a
history and destiny-at once personal and part of a larger collectivity." Joel Porte, Introduction: The
Portrait ofa Lady and "Felt Life," in NEW ESSAYS ON PORTRAIT OF A LADY 17 (Joel Porte ed., 1990).
131. JAMES, supra note 8, at 349.
132. Id. at 357.
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so achieving a more complete self-understanding.'
We saw the conception of duty that was implicit in the abstract
conception of human personality. There duty referred to the requirement
of respect for the boundaries of the moral agent, for the agent's
inviolability and capacity for free choice. But where human personality is
conceived as constituted by its relations, its history and moral tradition,
there is room for a richer conception of duty. Now our duties need not be
limited to the requirement that we keep our distance from one another;
they can include duties that sustain our common life and moral values and
make us the people we are. Whereas Isabel insisted upon justice in the first
half of the novel, she now insists upon her duty in marriage: "constantly
present to her mind were all the traditionary decencies and sanctities of
marriage. The idea of violating them filled her with shame as well as with
dread... ."134 Here marriage functions, I think, both as a symbol for the
idea of law-based community' and as an instance of moral tradition
sustained in a particular way of life. Thus, when Osmond tells Isabel that
she should not go to Ralph in defiance of his wishes, telling her that what
he values most in life "is the honour of a thing,"'3 6 his words strike an
important chord: "they represented something transcendent and absolute,
like the sign of the cross or the flag of one's country. He spoke in the
name of something sacred and precious-the observance of a magnificent
form."I 37 The use of the word "form" is of course important here, for it
suggests that Isabel's commitment is not to Osmond but to the duties that
comprise the moral tradition in which she finds her self-orientation, to the
fulfillment of her matrimonial duty without thought to its content.
Critics thus miss the point, I think, when they say that Isabel in the end
chooses her marriage with open eyes, for the narrator is explicit about the
fact that Isabel does not regard her duty to Osmond as a matter of choice:
"He was not one of the best husbands, but that didn't alter the case.
Certain obligations were involved in the very fact of marriage, and were
quite independent of the quantity of enjoyment extracted from it."'3 Wife
133. Sandel argues that
Where the ends of the self are given in advance, the relevant agency is not voluntarist but
cognitive, since the subject achieves self-command not by choosing that which is already given
(this would be unintelligible) but by reflecting on itself and inquiring into its constituent nature,
discerning its laws and imperatives, and acknowledging its purposes as its own.
Sandel, supra note 77, at 58; see also ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL
THEORY 220 (2007) (1981) ("[W]c all approach our own circumstances as bearers of a particular
social identity. I am someone's son or daughter. . .,l am a citizen of this or that city, a member of this
or that guild or profession; I belong to this clan, that tribe, this nation. Hence what is good for me has
to be the good of one who inhabits these roles ... .1 inherit from the past of my family, my city, my
tribe, my nation, a variety of debts, inheritances, rightfil expectations and obligations. These
constitute the given of my life, my moral starting point.").
134. JAMES, supra note 8, at 379.
135. Jottkandt, supra note 9, at 77.
136. JAMES, supra note 8, at 438.
137. Id. at 439.
138. Id at 474.
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of Osmond, mother of Pansy now appear as part of her very substance, not
contingencies to be stripped away. Isabel doesn't choose her obligations to
her husband; she rather recognizes the authority of those obligations, an
authority grounded in the moral tradition she now acknowledges as
constitutive of the person she is.
Following Ralph's death, Isabel has a final encounter with Caspar
Goodwood during which he begs her to leave her husband and pleads the
cause of freedom: "We can do absolutely as we please; to whom under the
sun do we owe anything? What is it that holds us, what is it that has the
smallest right to interfere in such a question as this? Such a question is
between ourselves-and to say that is to settle it!"I39 The narrator's
description of this encounter and Isabel's reaction to it is one of the
novel's most difficult passages:
The world ... seemed to open out, all round her, to take the form
of a mighty sea, where she floated in fathomless waters. She had
wanted help, and here was help; it had come in a rushing torrent. I
know not whether she believed everything he said; but she
believed just then that to let him take her in his arms would be the
next best thing to her dying. This belief, for a moment, was a kind
of rapture, in which she felt herself sink and sink. In the movement
she seemed to beat with her feet, in order to catch herself, to feel
something to rest on.... He glared at her a moment through the
dusk, and the next instant she felt his arms about her and his lips
on her own lips. His kiss was like white lightning, a flash that
spread, and spread again, and stayed .... So had she heard of
those wrecked and under water following a train of images before
they sink. But when darkness returned she was free. She never
looked about her; she only darted from the spot. There were lights
in the windows of the house; they shone far across the lawn. In an
extraordinarily short time-for the distance was considerable-she
had moved through the darkness (for she saw nothing) and reached
the door. Here only she paused. She looked all about her; she
listened a little; then she put her hand on the latch. She had not
known where to turn; but she knew now. There was a very straight
path. 140
The next day, we learn, Isabel returns to Rome and to Osmond. How
should we understand this complicated description of Isabel's reaction to
Goodwood and her realization that she must return to her marriage? The
first thing to notice is the significance of the water imagery. In the first
half of the novel, Isabel was frequently likened to the ship at sea. She was
"sailing in the bright light"' 4 ' and Ralph thought of putting "a little wind
139. Id. at 481.
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in her sails" and seeing her "going before the breeze."' 42 The image of the
ship sailing away from land, we said, is an image for one who is detached
from social conventions and free from the oppression of customary moral
norms. It is just this kind of freedom, the freedom of Isabel's early
conception, that Caspar insists upon when he tells her that they can do
absolutely as they please. But while the conception of herself as perfectly
independent with unfettered powers of choice once thrilled Isabel, it now
fills her with the sense, not of sailing, but of sinking in a "mighty sea," of
having nothing to hold onto and nothing solid to rest upon. The reason for
this change must be what Isabel learned in her marriage to Osmond. The
freedom to do as one pleases, the freedom of the self abstracted from its
particular life, needs, values and commitments, is in the end without
concrete reality; it leaves us wanting "something to rest on." Thus
freedom, for Isabel, is now found, not in the sea's "fathomless waters," but
in the house, an image for the moral traditions and values of a particular
way of life, a moral framework within which the individual shapes an
identity and a life of her own.
7. ISABEL'S TRAGEDY: THE LIMITS OF RECOGNITION
This is where the novel leaves Isabel and yet it is not, in my view, the
whole story. The reader sees something in Isabel's final decision that
Isabel does not see, something signaled by the narrator's language. We
notice that the narrator describes the "straight path" as a path of
darkness- "when darkness returned she was free"-and Isabel's
movement toward the straight path as a kind of blindness-"she saw
nothing."143 This recalls something we noted earlier-the fact that
Isabel's commitment to her marital duty is a commitment to a
"magnificent form." '" She accepts her duty in marriage to Osmond
without questioning its content. In thinking of her duty, we see that she
focuses on her marriage as an aspect of a moral tradition, as a sacred
ceremony: "What he thought of her she knew, what he was capable of
saying to her she had felt; yet they were married, for all that, and marriage
meant that a woman should cleave to the man with whom, uttering
tremendous vows, she had stood at the altar."'45 But what Isabel shuts her
eyes to as she moves through the darkness is what the moral tradition
means for her particular life, what marriage to a man who wishes her to
have no ideas and no independent mind means for her individual
happiness and flourishing. Isabel's final decision is obedience to a moral
law that makes Osmond her "appointed and inscribed master."' 46 We must
142. Id. at 158-59.
143. Id. at 482.
144. Id. at 439.
145. Id. at 441.
146. Id. at 379.
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wonder how Isabel could possibly regard this law-and her life under it-
as her own.
In her repudiation of her earlier conception of freedom as detached from
human lives, Isabel seems to miss the kernel of truth that lies at the heart
of that conception. It is that human beings, though touched by
circumstance and constituted in part by relations and values they
acknowledge, are also separate centers of value and self-determining
activity, bearers of ultimate worth and entitled to respect.1 47 And while it
is true that duty cannot be coherently limited by the idea of unfettered
choice, duty can be limited by the individual's demand that the law's
substance respect her worth as a determinate individual, a separate human
being with the capacity for agency and a life and mind of her own. Isabel's
failure to see this is, in my view, her tragedy. Thinking that she has found
a conception of freedom compatible with a robust sense of duty, she ends
up with a conception of duty incompatible with the ideal of living a life
one can recognize as one's own.
8. UNCONSCIONABILITY REVISITED
We can now return to the problem with which we began, the doctrine of
unconscionability and the competing conceptions of freedom that shape
the debate about its justification. There are important parallels between
Isabel's early conception of freedom and the conception of freedom
underlying the criticism of the unconscionability doctrine. The early Isabel
and the critics share a singular focus on the moral significance of the
agent's bare capacity for choice. As Isabel discovers the inadequacy of
this conception of freedom, the flaws in the critics' argument are put
before us as well. Where freedom is conceived as the capacity for choice,
freedom turns out to be consistent with a life lived in accordance with
whatever impulses or whims are thrown at us by our nature and so with a
life that fails to realize the human capacity for choice in a thought-out
conception of how to live. Moreover, in Isabel's marriage we see that the
freedom to choose may co-exist with manipulation. On this conception of
freedom, one may be perfectly free even as one is reduced to an
instrument of another's purpose. Finally, we saw that our ability to lead
lives that reflect our own choices has material conditions; without a
minimum amount of money and security in our ability to eat, sleep, and
clothe ourselves, we won't have the freedom to think about and act upon a
conception of what we want to do and who we want to be. All this
suggests that where freedom is conceived as the abstract capacity for
147. Isabel's final decision is thus an illustration of why some feminist scholars have worried
about the communitarian tendencies in feminist thought. Like Isabel, communitarians often seem to
accept without question the moral authority of a community's traditions and practices, which can be
oppressive and exploitative. See Marilyn Friedman, Feminism and Modern Friendship: Dislocating
the Community, 99 ETHICS 275-90 (1989).
2015] 243
31
Nadler: Unconscionability, Freedom, and The Portrait of a Lady
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
choice, it is an ideal that lacks any worldly meaning or reality. But if
human freedom is our ideal, then our understanding of freedom must
include a conception of its realization in lived human lives. An ideal of
freedom that lacks such a conception must be incomplete as an ideal for
human beings. The Portrait of a Lady thus ought to prompt our
reconsideration of the sufficiency of the unconscionability critics' account
of freedom because it, like Isabel's early conception, fails to attribute
normative significance to freedom's realization in concrete human lives.
The revealed deficiency of freedom as the bare capacity for choice in
The Portrait of a Lady begins to illuminate the normative foundation of
the doctrine of unconscionability, for the doctrine seems to respond to just
this deficiency. Consider again the facts in Walker-Thomas. The Walker-
Thomas Furniture Company operated its business in a neighborhood
where one quarter of the families lived in poverty. It operated by sending
out aggressive door-to-door salesmen, who presented customers with the
household items they badly needed and contracts with very small print.
The salesman told the customer to "just sign here" and did not point out
the contract's lease and pro rata provisions or explain their meaning.148
During one of these salesman's visits, Ora Williams signed a contract
wherein she risked losing her family's basic household items in exchange
for credit on the purchase of a stereo.
Critics of the unconscionability doctrine will say that Mrs. Williams
made a bad bargain, but the bad bargain was the product of her free
choice. She didn't have to sign the contract for the purchase of a stereo. If
she didn't understand the contract's terms, she could have sought outside
advice as to their meaning. She chose not to do so. Critics will say that
moral agents are respected when their choices are respected, even when
those choices turn out badly for them. To this we can now reply. First, we
can now notice that this was not simply a bad bargain. The problem with
Mrs. Williams' contract was not that she purchased a stereo on onerous
credit terms. The problem, rather, was that Mrs. Williams risked her
household necessities-beds, mattresses, cookware, a washing machine-
in order to purchase a stereo on credit. Since it was clear that Mrs.
Williams, who was supporting herself and seven children on two hundred
dollars a month, would not be able to make the thirty-six dollar monthly
payments on the stereo, we might even say that she traded her household
necessities in exchange for a few months' use of a stereo. That is not
simply a bad bargain the result of which is merely an unsatisfied personal
preference or a frustrated subjective goal; Williams traded away the
material conditions of human freedom, the material conditions of living a
life she can regard as her own. 149
148. Anne Fleming, The Rise and Fall of Unconscionability as the "Law of the Poor," 102 GEO.
L.J. 1383, 1395 (2014).
149. For this distinction see BRUDNER, supra note 36, at 224.
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Moreover, at trial, Williams testified that she would not have purchased
the stereo if she had understood that she was thereby risking the loss of her
basic household items. She thought that all her payments over the years
meant that those items were hers. Thus although there is no doubt that
Williams chose to sign the contract, we can say that her choice, though
free, was non-deliberative. She did not intend to trade her family's basic
household items for credit on the purchase of a stereo. Of course,
individuals act without thought or understanding all the time and we often
hold them responsible for their actions nevertheless. But where a contract
reflects one individual's non-deliberative alienation of the material
conditions of her freedom, a court may refuse to enforce it without
disrespect to the individual's moral agency. For here the court merely
recognizes what Portrait has taught us: the free moral agent is not a
philosophical abstraction but a human being with a life of her own to lead.
But the realized freedom of human beings has material conditions and is
threatened by the manipulation of ignorance and need. It therefore
depends upon the law's support and concern for its flourishing.
Justice Wright's ruling that a court may find a contract unenforceable
when it was made in the absence of meaningful choice for one party and
resulted in terms unreasonably favorable to the other party has been
criticized as vague.' But our discussion of Portrait suggests an
analytically precise interpretation of Justice Wright's vague references to
"meaningful choice" and terms "unreasonably favorable to the other
party." We might now suggest that the unconscionability doctrine allows
the judge to set aside a bargain that, though the product of a free choice,
nevertheless results in one party's non-deliberatively alienating the
material conditions of living a life reflective of self-authored ends. Now
the question is whether unconscionability must be interpreted in this
limited way, so that it is applicable only where the fact situation exhibits
both an absence of deliberation and a contract wherein the vulnerable
party has alienated the conditions of her realized autonomy. Our reading
of Portrait suggests that the answer to that question is yes.
Isabel's recognition of the falsity of her conviction of independence
leads to her final conception of free agency as the reflective endorsement
of one's place within a moral order, a set of duties embodied in a common
way of life. In the end, she recognizes the authority of the moral law that
makes her the person she is and that provides the context within which she
can regard her life as valuable. But as we have seen, the moral tradition
Isabel now recognizes as defining her duties as a responsible subject is one
150. See FRIED, supra note 1, at 103; John E. Murray Jr., Unconscionability: Unconscionability,
31 U. PiTY L. REV. 1, 2 (1969-1970). Bridwell criticizes Justice Wright's failure to explain what
constitutes a lack of meaningful choice and writes that the vagueness of the unconscionability doctrine
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that makes Osmond her "appointed and inscribed master."is' This means
that the law to which Isabel finally defers is indifferent to her
independence of mind, to her separate and individual worth, and to her
ability to regard her life as her own. This, I think, is why Isabel can only
stare at her marriage with "a sort of incredulous blankness," why the path
she chooses is described as a path of "darkness" and why her movement
along it is presented as a kind of blindness.
Many defenders of the unconscionability doctrine have made Isabel's
mistake. They have interpreted unconscionability as a declaration of
unenforceability based on the judge's moral conception of human well-
being, one that is indifferent to the individual's own view of the matter. As
we saw, Duncan Kennedy has interpreted unconscionability as a judicial
license to save people from themselves, to step in whenever there is a
danger that people will make agreements that are contrary to their well-
being.152 Anthony Kronman treats the doctrine of unconscionability as a
way for the judge to equalize welfare between the rich and the poor. In
response to the argument that the rich manufacturer will simply pass his
new cost on to the poor purchaser by charging a higher price for a vehicle
with a non-disclaimable warranty, Kronman writes that there is nothing
wrong with forcing people to buy protection they do not want.153 Seana
Shiffrin would allow a judge to refuse to enforce a one-sided bargain even
when made "under conditions of sufficient information."'5 4  On the
defenders' accounts of unconscionability, there is no exception for one
who deliberately chooses to do what the court thinks she ought not to do;
from the perspective of human welfare, the one who deliberately chooses
what is contrary to her true interests needs protection as much as the one
who blindly stumbles into error. These theorists would thus enforce a
moral law whose concern for human welfare pays no respect to the
individual's deliberate choice and so denies the individual her status as a
separate agent with a life and mind of her own.
All this suggests that the law must not only show support and concern
for the realized autonomy of its citizens; it must also find a way to embody
the particle of truth that lies at the heart of Isabel's early conception of
freedom. That truth is that human beings are separate centers of self-
determining activity, capable of independent thought and responsible
action. If the doctrine of unconscionability is to reflect this understanding
of human reality, it must be interpreted, not as a license for judges to
refuse to enforce all contracts that turn out to be contrary to one party's
well-being, but as an exception within a general scheme of freedom of
contract for those who, due to ignorance or extreme need, non-
151. JAMES, supra note 8, at 379.
152. Kennedy, supra note 2, at 634.
153. Kronman, supra note 2, at 773.
154. Shiffrin, supra note 7, at 209.
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deliberatively enter a contract wherein they alienate the material
conditions of living an autonomous life.
A consequence of this interpretation of the unconscionability doctrine is
that while Williams v. Walker-Thomas was rightly decided, Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors was not. This is so for two reasons. First, whereas the
goods at stake in Walker-Thomas were basic household necessities
required for living for personal goals beyond survival, what Henningsen
agreed to by accepting the standard term was to bear the burden if the car
turned out to be a lemon. But since it seems unreasonable to think that
owning an automobile with a robust warranty is a necessary condition of
living a life whose overall shape reflects one's values and purposes, we
cannot say that in signing the contract, Henningsen alienated a condition
of his realized autonomy.
Second, much has been made of the fact that in Henningsen, the
disclaimer of warranty was presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis so that
no bargaining was possible. Many have written as though Henningsen had
no choice but to accept the disclaimer of warranty because it was a
standard term in the automobile industry.'"' But this of course is not true;
Henningsen could have chosen to forgo the purchase. The industry-wide
standard terms meant that the car company was in a position of superior
bargaining power once Henningsen had decided to buy a car, but as long
as the party in the weaker bargaining position can walk away, superiority
of bargaining power is not, by itself, enough to establish that the terms
were not deliberatively agreed upon. Moreover, it is important to notice
that the decision in Henningsen did not depend on the court's finding that
the disclaimers were hidden in the contract's fine print or that their
significance was unintelligible to the ordinary consumer. The decision
rested on the court's conclusion that a car manufacturer's disclaimers of
the warranty of merchantability and of liability for consequential damages
were "so inimical to the public good" that they could not be enforced. In
other words, no consumer could choose to accept the limited warranty and
limitation of liability in exchange for a cheaper vehicle-not even a
consumer who understood the full implications of this bargain and wanted
it anyway. In its concern for human welfare, the court in Henningsen
forgets that the welfare we care about is the welfare of individual human
beings, separate persons capable of choice and responsibility.
But where unconscionability is interpreted to require, not merely an
improvident bargain, but an improvident bargain made in circumstances of
ignorance or extreme need and without independent advice, the individual
who acts with full knowledge and understanding may still choose to do
155. Murray writes: "as to a certain material provision in the contract, he had no choice at all
since he could either procure the deal with no other party, or even if he could, the identical or similar
provision would have again confronted him.... [This] smacks of duress; it is something like duress."
Murray, supra note 150, at 4.
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with her own life what the morally authoritative conception of her well-
being thinks she ought not to do. And where unconscionability applies
only to those cases where (as in Walker-Thomas) the individual alienates
the universal conditions of living autonomously and not to cases where (as
in Henningsen) the individual has simply made a bad bargain from the
perspective of her personal interests or goals, the law shows concern for
freedom's vulnerability without denying the individual's responsibility for
her choices. When the doctrine of unconscionability is interpreted in this
way, it embodies the complex set of truths that Portrait of a Lady teaches
us. The freedom of human beings is meaningful only if it is freedom
realized in a life reflective of self-authored ends. Because, however,
freedom in that sense is vulnerable to circumstance and manipulation, it
depends upon the positive support and concern of a moral community
independent of our wills-one that the court represents. Still, such a
community would destroy the freedom it is supposed to fulfill if it did not
also treat human beings as separate, responsible agents with independent
minds and lives of their own, as much entitled to the court's respect for
their deliberate choices as to its concern for their objective well-being.
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